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Material Memory: The Politics
of Nostalgia on the Eve of MAGA 
Bryan D. Price
Charlottesville 
On the evening of August 
11, 2017, images began coming 
over the internet and cable news 
transoms of mainly young and 
serious-faced white men carrying 
torches and chanting “you will 
not replace us”—a phrase with a 
European provenance geared 
toward Muslims—along with the 
anti-Semitic derivation, “Jews 
will not replace us,” and the Nazi-
tinged incantation of “blood and 
soil.” They were marching in a 
column toward the Rotunda on the 
University of Virginia’s campus 
in Charlottesville, which houses 
a statue of the school’s founder, 
Thomas Jefferson. This torchlight 
march bearing the ritualism of a 
midnight ride by the Ku Klux Klan 
or even a Nazi rally—many of the participants displayed Nazi paraphernalia—
was a precursor to a rightwing demonstration the following day to protest the 
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impending removal of a memorial to the Confederate General, Robert E. Lee. 
That day’s rally erupted in violence culminating in the death of a young woman. 
As the chaos unfolded, the former Klansman and past member of the Loui-
siana House of Representatives, David Duke, told a news reporter that the rally 
would “fulfill the promises of Donald Trump.” This vague comment seemed to 
draw even closer together the ideologies of the President and his most fervent 
white nationalist supporters, who had gathered that day in an unashamed display 
of a self-conscious white supremacy the likes of which seemed hidden away in 
our nation’s id. When the President failed to condemn the far right participants 
who precipitated much of the violence—or differentiate between the far right 
protesters and the liberal counter-protesters—it seemed to confirm the fears of 
many that President Trump’s ideological predilections were intimately bound up 
with a particularly virulent strain of nativism, if not outright white supremacy. 
MAGA
Much of what many have found so alarming about the recent turn of events 
has to do with the ways in which this confluence of whiteness and what it means 
to be American is inflected by the contested nature of collective memory. The 
instigation, for instance, of the Charlottesville debacle had to do with the civic 
worthiness of a Robert E. Lee statue, an object in which many see a distilla-
tion of Southern courage and heritage, and yet others see a monument that 
commemorates a time of mythical white unity, erected, like many Confederate 
monuments, as a symbol of the power, awe, and terror of white supremacy. 
The President, since Charlottesville, has made the protection and celebration of 
Confederate monuments a dominant feature of his culture war posture known, 
if only euphemistically, as Trumpism.
Trumpism is by no means a precise ideology—at least not yet—but in a very 
broad way it is characterized by an indifference to suffering, fear-mongering 
about perceived outsiders, the exacerbation of existing cultural fissures in or-
der to undermine any kind of consensus, the aestheticization of violence, and, 
most important for the purposes of this essay, a revanchist need to reclaim the 
hegemony of a largely patriarchal whiteness lost to liberalism’s meddling desire 
to topple it. This longing is characterized by the deeply nostalgic slogan Make 
America Great Again, shortened to the quickly mutating neologism MAGA, a 
phrase that, if one is troubled by this recent reckoning with American Fascism, 
chills the blood. 
In this climate of MAGA, it is difficult not to see battle lines drawn across 
the arc of time in which we ask ourselves what constitutes not only America 
and greatness, but at what temporal point did it all turn so wrong? Even if we 
believe that history is cyclical and dynamic, as I do, it is hard to argue that this 
particular moment is not characterized by some kind of intense and rare malaise. 
Given this feeling of melancholy across the ideological spectrum, it is natural to 
seek out critical shifts or even ruptures where time breaks and we are prompted 
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to gaze back over the abyss. As our horizons of expectation concerning future 
happiness have become constrained, a reaction, for many, has been to abandon 
conventional politics—a circumstance unaided by the growing power of pluto-
cratic mega-donors, making it seem as if the American experiment in democratic 
liberalism is itself slipping away into the past—and fixate on a very narrow and 
tribalist politics of culture and identity typified by appeals to some prelapsarian 
unity that many seek to restore. This desire takes its most noxious form among 
those so-called “white nationalists” who advocate for a derogation of utopia in 
the shape of a white “ethno-state.” 
•••
Much has been made of Trumpism and the longing of its most nostalgic 
adherents. Since the rise, and particularly the triumph of Trump, it has become 
de rigueur to write think pieces, columns, and other stories probing the deep 
connections between Trumpism and nostalgia with titles like, “Trump’s Rhetoric 
of White Nostalgia (The Atlantic),” “Why White, Evangelical Nostalgia Voters 
Choose Trump (The Atlantic),” and “Nostalgia: The Yearning That Will Con-
tinue To Carry the Trump Message Forward (The Guardian).” Recently in the 
New Yorker, the Russian and American journalist, Masha Gessen, who is very 
familiar with the current global confluence of nostalgia and authoritarianism 
put it, perhaps a bit gently, noting how, “In the nostalgic campaign that got him 
elected, Trump promised to take his voters back to an imaginary past in which 
they felt better, more secure, and generally more great than they do in the present.” 
This is at once obvious for nearly any conservative politician, and yet extremely 
distressing given the violence lurking behind his supporters’ calls for restoration. 
While liberal historians, as well as polemicists, have long condemned nos-
talgia’s fugue state for the more egregious cases of conservative reaction and 
historical amnesia that have, at intermittent moments, gripped the United States 
and Europe, under the spell of Trumpism, nostalgia has emerged as something 
more sinister, actuating dark fantasies of racial realignment and the coming of an 
authoritarian regime tinged with threats of violence. In the midst of our current 
malaise, in other words, the mere mention of nostalgia is often conflated with 
the rise of Trumpism. 
I was struck by this fact when going over a recent spate of books having to 
do with how we consume, mourn, and are confounded by the slipperiness of our 
collective past. These works, Harriet F. Senie’s Memorials to Shattered Myths: 
Vietnam to 9/11 (2016), James E. Young’s The Stages of Memory: Reflections on 
Memorial Art, Loss, and the Spaces Between (2016), Gary Cross’s Consumed 
Nostalgia: Memory in the Age of Fast Capitalism (2015), and Owen Hatherley’s 
The Ministry of Nostalgia (2016) offer an almost disorienting look at the politics 
of nostalgia on the eve of Trump’s rise, before his ubiquitous red hat had been 
burned into our collective imaginations. The authors are all critical, to one degree 
or another, of nostalgia, but their critiques do not anticipate the force and fury with 
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which this restorative nostalgia has devoured our political culture and discourse. 
Two of these works, for instance, which are explicitly devoted to monuments, 
do not allude in any substantive way to our current infatuation with Confederate 
monuments. To be clear, this is not a failing at all of the authors, but rather an 
illuminating fact about the intensity and speed with which we have come to this 
moment. And while each of these works do not foresee the coming specter of 
Trumpism with its recrudescence of a Confederate-era white supremacy, as one 
digs deeper down, the trajectory towards this reckoning reveals itself. 
Material memory
In each of the works under review here, there is a rather vivid material 
component to memory and nostalgia. Whether these works deal with monuments 
(material reminders meant to collectively remember, largely traumatic events), or 
the quotidian things that people collect in order to remember various pasts lost 
in the maelstrom of modernity, or even the ubiquitous tchotchkes inscribed with 
the banal statement, Keep Calm And Carry On, as a means of misremembering 
some form of British midcentury austerity, underlying the consumption of these 
objects is the fundamental desire to mobilize the past in order to reconstitute some 
vague sense of the familiar as the present becomes both estranging and fractured. 
This emphasis on materiality and fracture makes nostalgia into a potent force 
that blurs the boundaries between politics and aesthetics. In this way, nostalgia 
is often affiliated with the world of the senses. Discovered by a Swiss doctor in 
the seventeenth century, nostalgia was at first a literal disease (akin to home-
sickness) that afflicted soldiers and servants made to serve far from their Swiss 
homes. The concept migrated, first geographically and then metaphorically, but 
it has always maintained a deeply sensual component. These early sufferers of 
nostalgia, as Jean Starobinski has shown us, were actuated by sound: the rush 
of a river or the familiar noise of a cracked bell reminiscent of abandoned native 
villages. It has become almost a cliché to dwell, like Proust, on the turbid flood 
brought about by a tea-soaked madeleine. Just as nostalgia has metastasized and 
crossed disciplinary boundaries, it has colonized various discourses concerning 
materiality from the vast—architecture, landscapes, ruins, monuments—to the 
scaled down and quotidian—memorabilia, keepsakes, collectibles, photographs. 
In the hands of twentieth-century philosophers concerned with revisions 
brought about by modernity, a potent metaphor emerged that blended nostalgia 
and materiality having to do with the trajectory between unity and fragmentation. 
There is a passage, for instance, from the Isaiah Berlin essay, “The Decline of 
Utopian Ideas in the West,” which conveys this material imaginary concerning 
nostalgia in its broadest sense. “Our lives,” wrote Berlin, “are conceived as an 
agonized effort to piece together the broken fragments of the perfect whole with 
which the universe began, and to which it may yet return.” This “persistent idea,” 
Berlin continued, “underlies all the old Utopias and has deeply influenced western 
metaphysical, moral, and political ideas.” Or consider, Albert Camus’s Myth of 
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Sisyphus (1942), which addresses a world that has been revealed as inscrutable 
and wrecked, producing a “nostalgia for unity” and an “appetite for the absolute.” 
Camus continued, “So long as the mind keeps silent in the motionless world of 
its hopes, everything is reflected and arranged in the unity of its nostalgia. But 
with its first move this world cracks and tumbles: an infinite number of shim-
mering fragments is offered to the understanding.” 
This modernist handling of nostalgia begins in the acknowledgement that 
absolutes have been wrecked and destroyed: reduced to “partial objects” and other 
shattered bits. This idea of time materialized and then smashed into multitudes 
however, is at its most potent (and famous) in Walter Benjamin’s allegory of the 
Angel of History that characterized the unfoldment of time-as-history in terms of 
the ruins and debris of progress unfolding as a catastrophic rupture that produces 
the desire to “make whole what has been smashed.” “This is how the angel of 
history must look,” wrote Benjamin in his last manuscript before taking his life 
in 1940 while he himself was running from his Nazi pursuers, 
His face is turned toward the past. Where a chain of events 
appears before us, he sees one single catastrophe, which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it at his feet. The 
angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole 
what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise 
and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that the angel 
can no longer close them. This storm drives him irresistibly 
into the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of 
debris before him grows toward the sky. What we call progress 
is this storm.
 
Instead of nostalgia being, as many of its detractors would have us believe, the 
past frozen into a deathly form of perfect ideological compliance, in Benjamin’s 
estimation it was an ambivalent gaze that fell upon the past as a dispersion of 
fragments that could never attain their original unity. In this way the past may, 
instead of exuding some vampiric quality, live alongside us and be made useful 
in its hybridity and heterogeneity.
Monumental Nostalgia 
As metaphorical or even literary as these conceptions of time and memory 
are, they are given real material resonance in the various avenues nostalgia offers 
to reconvene the past, however imagined that past may be. As James Young writes 
in his introduction to The Stages of Memory, “Part of our contemporary culture’s 
hunger for the monumental . . . is its nostalgia for the universal values and ethos 
by which it once knew itself as a unified culture.” This idea of “monumental 
nostalgia,” where contested visions of experience and remembrance collide 
has become, as referenced above, a particularly intense flashpoint in this recent 
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installment of our ongoing culture war pitting history against myth, and as these 
allusions to fragments and wholes would suggest, a perceived universality con-
cerning American values against the multitudinous nature of our contemporary 
culture oriented toward a variety of particularisms. 
•••
A discussion of monuments, particularly in the hands of Senie and Young, 
inevitably becomes a discussion of death, primarily political death, bordering 
on martyrdom. The event—though the word is far too benign—that hangs over 
any such discussion is, of course, the Holocaust. This is particularly the case for 
Young, the director of the institute for Holocaust, Genocide, and Memory Stud-
ies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, as well as a widely published 
author on public art, collective memory, and memorials, who covers a wider 
global frame than Senie, an Art History and Museum Studies Professor at City 
College, City University of New York, who offers analysis confined to the United 
States. The connective tissue between each of these works, however, are extended 
discussions of the 9/11 memorial (Reflecting Absence) and a shared awe at the 
gentle woundedness of Maya Lin’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial, the placidity of 
which, Senie characterizes as “therapeutic.” Each also focuses on the contentious 
nature of memorial building, focusing on the trajectory from a spontaneous web 
of memorials to judged competitions, and then the finished products themselves, 
of which Young eschews in favor of anatomizing the traumatic “process and 
work of memory (17).” Senie, as her title would suggest, Memorials to Shattered 
Myths, is more concerned with the quintessentially American desire to deflect 
our attention from “actual events,” which she reads as a “form of denial” that 
emphasizes the funerary aspect of American commemorative built environments 
that seek to overwhelm our need to resolve historic problems with the solemn 
demand that we respect the dead—an instinct familiar to all who observe after 
an American mass-shooting the admonishment to not “politicize” the tragedy. 
While the absence of Trumpism in these works on monuments in particular, 
as I had mentioned above, was striking given its prominence in recent discourse, 
in taking a closer look, one can detect the gathering storm. Young, for instance, 
completes The Stages of Memory with a chapter on Utøya, the Norwegian Island 
that the terrorist Anders Breivik visited on July 22, 2011 in order to murder 69 
young members of a Workers’ Youth League summer camp after having detonated 
a bomb in Oslo killing eight. I fixate on this chapter because it complicates the 
American exceptionalist idea of a country, held widely by conservatives, of a 
people, a creed, and a culture, ideologically separate from its European forebears, 
revealing instead global links among identitarians for whom their nation, and by 
extension, patriotism, is subservient to their whiteness. 
Like many ideological fanatics, Breivik left behind a manifesto, in which 
he wallowed in retrograde ideas that have become commonplace in America 
lately as media attention has been showered on radical white supremacists like 
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Richard Spencer, the president of the National Policy Institute, who advocates 
for an all-white state and who helped to organize the violent Charlottesville 
rally. The narrative of Anders Breivik and his terrifying murderous rampage at 
Utøya ties our current pathologies to those of Europe along the racist lines of 
preserving some vague form of whiteness rooted in the conception of the past as 
prelapsarian and pure, and the present in a state of cultural ruins. Of an imagined 
and Edenic nineteen-fifties family who could have time-traveled to the present 
and then made their way back to tell of their miraculous travels, Breivik writes, 
“Their story would be of a nation that had decayed and degenerated at a fantastic 
pace, moving in less than a half a century from the greatest countries on earth to 
Third World nations, overrun by crime, noise, drugs and dirt.” 
Breivik presents a worldview that is not far removed from what is offered 
today by Trumpism; the manifesto is littered with fallacies, imagined futures (and 
pasts), and paeans to a beautifully resilient western (white) European history that 
had fallen under the spell of Marxism, feminism, and then, inevitably Islam, all 
of which sought to erode the traditional hegemony of an all white Europe. “Time 
is of the essence.” He wrote, “We have only a few decades to consolidate a suf-
ficient level of resistance before our major cities are completely demographically 
overwhelmed by Muslims.” The coming Muslim horde, according to Breivik, was 
conditioned by a liberal culture of “political correctness” that disallowed critiques 
of otherness based solely on its deviation from whiteness, and thus slaughtered 
what he perceived to be the future of liberalism in the form of innocent children. 
Young, in delineating the unfolding of a memorial process which was made 
even more complex by the geographical scope of the tragedy—the murdered 
children came from all over Norway, which produced a commemorative unfold-
ment that was similarly territorially spread out—acknowledges the idea that 
Norway was ill prepared to commemorate such a tragedy, because it had been 
“blessedly” free of both “domestic mass murder and the memorial traditions” that 
attend them. Left unsaid was that this act of diabolical mass murder seems more 
at home in America with its addiction to firearms and the polarizing controversy 
such an addiction invites. Senie, in her interrogation of the American scene, pays 
close attention to such events and their meaning through memorial-making (or 
the eliding that that process conveys), focusing in particular on the Columbine 
Massacre and the Oklahoma City bombing, the memorial to which, Senie notes, 
fails to address the “fissures in the social fabric of Middle America” that the 
man who perpetrated it, Timothy McVeigh, was a product of. These fissures, 
typified by McVeigh’s “passionate interest in guns and survivalism,” had to do 
with a long-standing conservative mistrust of the federal government, and its 
“infringement on individual rights.” 
Memorials to Shattered Myths works as a helpful preamble to our current 
malaise. The point of Senie’s work is that in our failure to account for the root 
causes of these self-inflicted tragedies by instead focusing on the private trauma 
associated with personal grief we have also failed to confront a tortured history 
that, in my estimation, has led inexorably to our current reckoning. This places 
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a heavy burden upon memorials, but the seemingly unending repetition of such 
incidents reveals our failure to even approach, however tentatively, a resolution 
of radical differences that are invigorated by a commemorative impulse to forget 
them. In promoting a narrative that focuses on the depoliticized memory of the 
dead, or even the singular “evil” of the lone perpetrator, as opposed to the histori-
cal movements that such perpetrators represent, we have left these wounds to 
fester and metastasize, bringing us to this moment where such noxious ideologies 
have become normalized by a media climate obsessed with paying equal attention 
and, sadly, respect, to “both sides,” even if one side seeks to exterminate the other. 
In lamenting the process of the Oklahoma City Bombing in particular, Senie 
writes, “Although the bombing offered ample evidence of a dissident core in the 
nation’s heartland, no aspect of the three-part built memorial… acknowledges 
fissures in the body politic (61).” The instinct to collapse the difference between, 
in Senie’s phrase, the “heroes and victims” of a given tragic event creates the 
conditions for our historic irresponsibility in which we obscure or totally elide 
our tragic missteps and absolve ourselves of our moral culpability as a society. To 
not confront the pathologies that exist within these “fissures in our body politic,” 
is to, in other words, make an unofficial “pact of forgetting”—though not, as in 
Spain, legally—in which we agree not to peer behind the curtain of our differ-
ences in order to commemorate, not only the victims of a tragedy, but the rancid 
and dissident worldview that has produced such monsters as Timothy McVeigh 
who are motivated by their illiberalism and radical anti-statism as justifications 
for mass-murder. When we agree to forget not only the meaning, but the causes 
of a tragedy, we rob ourselves of resolution and doom our progeny with further 
damage. This has become apparent in our recent reckoning with Confederate 
monuments, a product of more than a century of amnesia hastened by the atten-
tion we have paid to various myths of honor and the war dead at the expense 
of what such people fought and died protecting: a culture built upon the rock, 
not only of buying and selling human beings, but of a white supremacy that is 
returning upon us like a dark wave.
Capital and Austerity
It can be argued that this recent rightward shift has been hastened by the 
2008 global financial crisis in which the scarcity of certain resources, particularly 
jobs and housing, has created a global backlash against immigrants and refugees. 
And while conspiratorial fanatics like Timothy McVeigh—and other recent 
anti-statists, such as Cliven Bundy—may conjure up fantasies of a tyrannical 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms or the Bureau of Land Management, 
plotting, behind closed doors, the enslavement of the American people, capital, 
by and large, unregulated and untethered from any sense of the common good, 
has done, it would seem, far greater damage to the fortunes of working people in 
this country and abroad. As anxieties rise, wealth falls, jobs are lost, homes are 
abandoned, and debt piles up, nostalgia, because of its terminological slipperi-
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ness, becomes a seductive conceptual framework through which to view politics, 
culture (particularly so-called consumer culture), art, aesthetics, anything really 
that falls within the realm of criticism. 
Two recent works, from two very different perspectives (as well as conti-
nents), seek to elucidate the links between capital and nostalgia, a complicated 
project that goes back to at least the postwar period in America. Gary Cross’s 
Consumed Nostalgia and Owen Hatherley’s The Ministry of Nostalgia describe 
something disquieting about how the past is mobilized in order to make palatable 
the negative revisions brought about by modern capitalism. In Cross’s hands, 
nostalgia becomes therapeutic as a kind of siren song enveloping cultural arti-
facts designed to deliver those of us troubled by the vicissitudes of capitalism 
into a simpler past; for Hatherley though it is just as seductive, but instead of 
encouraging consumption it makes palatable the bare existence of Britain’s recent 
movement toward austerity and the dismantling of its welfare state. In each case 
the author seeks to anatomize nostalgia and trace its theoretical equipment into 
the past, and in each case finds its genealogy degenerate from something natu-
ral, actual, and based on lived experience to, for Hatherley, the protection and 
reimagining of a “remarkably distorted idea of the past,” and for Cross, a state of 
pure infantilization, reducing nostalgia to the desire to recover or re-experience 
one’s past through the consumption of certain artifacts associated with childhood. 
Cross seeks to empathize with such desires in an age of “fast capitalism…a 
particularly intensive form of commodity culture, entailing the increasingly rapid 
pace of production and purchase, creating profit through the fast turnaround of 
investment.” Such a process, in Cross’s analysis, has created disquietude among 
many, producing a “distinctly modern” kind of stress by which, “people found 
identity and meaning in specific goods but, as a result felt their selfhoods were 
threatened when those things disappeared.” As a reaction to “fast capitalism” 
a new strain of nostalgia emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, 
christened by Cross as “consumed nostalgia,” which has largely been manifested 
in the collecting of dolls and other toys (including “muscle cars”) and the con-
sumption of old music and 1950s and 1960s-era television shows. In this way, 
Cross opposes this consumption of one’s personal childhood ephemera to older 
varieties of nostalgia, which he terms communal, familial, and fashion, primarily 
on the grounds that consumed nostalgia is bound to a desire to re-experience the 
past and, in a related way, speaks to something intensely personal as opposed 
to collective or communitarian—an attempt, for better or worse, to depoliticize 
nostalgia, which has the quality of forgiving “fast capitalism” for creating such 
“disquietude.” This in turn makes it so the critique falls, unjustly in my opinion, 
on nostalgia, as opposed to capitalism. 
In Hatherley’s case, austerity nostalgia, is deeply political in its offering 
in place of past promises of working-class liberation through a robust, socialist 
welfare state, “a return of repression itself” by urging the acceptance of suffering 
and going without made palatable by the cold comfort of Blitz-era encourage-
ment. Just as the campaign of Donald Trump brought to the world the nostalgic 
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slogan Make America Great Again in the material form of a red hat, austerity 
nostalgia, according to Hatherley, has been reduced to shorthand in a similarly 
mass-produced fashion recognizable worldwide. Hatherley relates in an anec-
dote about being confronted in a department store in Poland by, “a collection of 
notebooks, mouse pads, diaries and the like, featuring a familiar English sans 
serif font, white on red, topped with the crown above the legend, in English: 
Keep Calm and Carry On.” This seemingly innocuous phrase, for Hatherley, 
alludes to a manipulative cultural process by which Britons have been seduced 
by this notion of themselves as self-denying, ascetic, tough-minded, and able to 
withstand all manner of deprivations. But instead of marshaling such fortitude in 
order to resist Hitler’s Blitzkrieg, its contemporary form is mobilized as a means 
of acquiescing to Tory austerity measures and the neoliberal push to privatize, 
at least portions of Britain’s welfare state in the form of public housing and the 
National Health Service. Austerity nostalgia then, is the kind of nostalgia that 
seeks to make the endurance of suffering agreeable, perhaps even enjoyable 
on the grounds that such asceticism is woven into the British character. Such a 
nostalgia exists under the assumption, like those who long for the historical unity, 
some may say homogeneity, that monuments can confer, that a single strain of 
historical patrimony can be reinstated in a multivocal present. 
•••
Each of these works fits into a longstanding critique of nostalgia as fictive, 
amnesia-driven, quasi-fascist, or therapeutic. As early as 1948, the liberal histo-
rian Richard Hofstadter condemned an “overpowering nostalgia” for producing 
a “ravenous appetite for Americana,” by which he meant “historical novels, fic-
tionalized biographies, collections of pictures and cartoons, books on American 
regions and rivers.” This was certainly not the first attack on nostalgia, but it 
revealed the contours of a now popular and longstanding critique of nostalgia as 
sentimental, weak-minded, opposed to the hard truth of history, and—as Cross 
suggests—oriented toward objects and other fetishized commodities. 
This critique spooled out in different directions over the ensuing decades 
coming to its apogee in 1991 with Michael Kammen’s Mystic Chords of Memory, 
which enjoined previous works (both British) such as Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger’s The Invention of Traditions (1983) and Robert Hewison’s The Heritage 
Industry (1987), in castigating nostalgia as “those memories and traditions so new 
in origin that the banality of their invocation is manifest.” Such memories, Kam-
men further advised, were to be dismissed “as mere nostalgia . . . the exploitation 
of heritage . . . the utilization of utterly contrived myths.” Nineteen ninety one 
also saw Christopher Lasch’s The True and Only Heaven—in which he devoted 
a (largely brilliant) chapter to nostalgia as the “abdication of memory”—and 
Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 
which discerned a difference between the pain-inflected “modernist nostalgia” 
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of a figure like Walter Benjamin and the commodified pastiche of retro that 
capitalism offered as a pallid substitute for the past. 
While each of these works fit into this critical genealogy of nostalgia, what is 
so different about them is how they envision the stakes of nostalgia. In the case of 
Cross, because of the scope of his inquiry the stakes are quite low, which makes 
the analysis unsatisfying somehow. I cannot help thinking that this is through 
no fault of his own, but because of this moment we have found ourselves in, 
where nostalgia is invested with so much critical import, which, without even 
its recent embeddedness with Trumpism, I believe it deserves. Cross’s instinct to 
depoliticize nostalgia has the effect of confining nostalgia’s, in this case, negative 
force, to a largely affluent consumer culture addicted not merely to antiques, but 
to their childhoods. 
This insistence on tethering nostalgia to the recovery of one’s childhood 
lies partially in Cross’s intellectual background, having written a book about 
the history of children and their relationships with toys—Kids’ Stuff: Toys and 
the Changing World of American Childhood (1999). Tracing such desires into 
adulthood though provides only a restricted vision of a concept as protean and 
capacious as nostalgia. What is particularly troubling is that Cross presents “con-
sumed nostalgia” as the most advanced (not as sophisticated but most reflective 
of the present) stage of an evolutionary concept. While Cross certainly allows for 
a “modern nostalgia” that “is a richly complex and even contradictory phenom-
enon,” he often uses language intimating that his concept of “consumed nostalgia” 
holds some present primacy: “Today’s nostalgia seems to help us cope with the 
extraordinary speed-up of time by letting us return to our childhoods…Today’s 
nostalgia is rooted in special emotions linked to recovering memories distinctive 
to the objects of modern childhood and consumerism,” and “the homesickness 
that once drove [nostalgia] has largely been replaced by a desire to recover the 
things and experiences of a novelty-driven consumer society.” Cross cannot in a 
single work be made to consider nostalgia in its many forms, and yet to reduce it 
to what can be read as a retreat from the instability of capitalism and modernity 
into the womb of childhood, in my opinion, does little to convince its (largely 
progressive and liberal) critics of its aesthetic, as well as political worthiness. 
Perhaps it is Cross’s constrained vision of the materialities of nostalgia 
that unsettles me. The things that demand our nostalgic attention ought not be 
confined to the remnants of our childhoods. To quarantine nostalgia to the spe-
cifically personal—to the plane of psychology—forecloses a host of nostalgic 
attachments. In our current age, it is important to see nostalgia in its many guises, 
some innocent and innocuous, some sophisticated and productive, and some 
grimly malignant. On at least two occasions Cross mentions the late scholar 
of Slavic literature, Svetlana Boym, and her groundbreaking The Future of 
Nostalgia (2001). No figure has done more to repair nostalgia’s battered image 
than Boym, famous for her typology that separated nostalgia’s quasi-fascist 
and conspiratorial imagination from its poetic, modernist desire to reflect upon 
the past’s shadowy back alleys. Boym’s project emphasized the poetry of the 
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discontinuous, the fragmentary, the partial, and the ruinous in light of the total-
izing force that describes the xenophobic and reactionary quality of nostalgia. 
Opposing his own vision of nostalgia, Cross writes, “instead of seeking a lost 
community or cause, we recover our personal childhoods in a vast array of objects 
and recorded sensations. This essentially negates Boym’s critique of nostalgia.” 
I respectfully part company with Cross on this point. Boym, far from reducing 
nostalgia to an “intolerant tribalism” or “narrowly cast familialism,” created a 
powerful hermeneutic with which to “read” a variety of landscapes, texts, and 
images across numerous historical topographies in order to discern various pro-
ductions of nostalgic desire where one would have scarcely noticed them before 
for fear of trafficking in such a disparaged idea. 
The history of nostalgia is rich, complicated, and largely one which turns on 
lexicographical matters. Having been coined to describe a seventeenth century 
disease (a literal homesickness) it has been made to carry a lot of freight over 
the years migrating between the realms of medicine, psychology, politics, and 
culture. Perhaps the plane that Consumed Nostalgia covers is too narrow for my 
taste, too wedded to the dictates of psychology and the realm of the individual. I 
think Boym points us toward nostalgia’s more complicated analytical promise. 
“Unlike melancholia,” Boym noticed, “which confines itself to the planes of 
individual consciousness, nostalgia is about the relationship between individual 
biography and the biography of groups or nations, between personal and collective 
memory.” This hybrid notion of a nostalgia that plays between the spaces of the 
individual and the collective, politics and aesthetics, the temporal and the material, 
offers the richest vision of nostalgia as it relates to our understanding of histories 
complicated by the “disquieting” injunctions of modernity and capitalism. 
 
•••
In Hatherley’s field of vision, nostalgia can be insidious, but it is more of a 
political tactic (or strategic language) than an infantilizing disease. And while 
he uses the mass-produced imagery of Keep Calm and Carry On as an entry 
point into the contours of nostalgia discourse, his passion lies in how this brand 
of nostalgia has been mobilized in order to revise the built environment of Eng-
land, tilting it away from the egalitarianism that the welfare state had promised 
before the triumph of the Thatcherite right hell-bent on destroying the idea of the 
state’s responsibility to provide for its people in the form of a National Health 
Service, Council Estates, the comprehensive schools, and New Universities. 
It is not Thatcher at all that comes under attack, however, but who we refer to 
in the United States as the Baby Boomers (in Hatherley’s phrase, the similarly 
liberal “late sixties generation”) who have done much to dismantle the welfare 
state with “hysterical” attacks “on social democracy” as “statist” and even “to-
talitarian.” What emerges in The Ministry of Nostalgia is not merely an attack 
on the nostalgia that makes this dismantling possible through the consolation of 
oneself with the “iconography of a completely different and unlikely era,” but 
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two competing visions of nostalgia itself, which Hatherley, perhaps unwittingly, 
reveals in his own desire to reinstate the past in the form of the welfare state that 
was partially put into practice between 1945 and 1979. 
I use the term “unwittingly,” because Hatherley does not seem to want his 
desired ends to be tainted by the stigma of nostalgia, but that is only because 
nostalgia has been freighted with such a stigma by generations of authors clearly 
uneasy about the ways in which the past and present are nested together. And, as 
is often the case, those who are branded as nostalgic are generally conservative, 
regressive, revanchist, or reactionary. Hatherley admits as much, noting, when 
it comes to weaponizing the past, “the Conservative party are, and always have 
been, the experts (12).” In absorbing Hatherley’s instincts about the past and his 
prescriptions for the present, however, it is clear that another type of nostalgia is 
at work, one that is not oriented toward, what Boym characterized as “restorative” 
nostalgia, which describes the current nationalist tirades going on from Trumpist 
America to England and its Brexit fever. While Hatherley may find nostalgia to 
be an insidious feature of our current neo-liberal moment, what animates his own 
personal project of “attempting to rehabilitate the built environment created by 
this moment of social democracy,” if not a nostalgia that operates upon a differ-
ent ideological principle, not restorative, but in Boym’s phrase, “reflective.” His 
language invokes the materialist image of nostalgia as the bringing back together 
of a past torn asunder by, in Benjamin’s phrase, “progress.” “The fragments of 
it,” Hatherley continues referring to his socialist project concerning a fair and 
equitable built environment, “do prove that an egalitarian future is feasible.” 
At this present moment, an egalitarian future only seems possible to someone 
invested in the past, not with a cold-eyed and progressive rationalism, but with 
a utopian desire to reconvene what Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, in 
their Dialectic of Enlightenment, had referred to as “past hopes,” writing, “what 
is at stake is not the conservation of the past but the fulfillment of past hopes.” 
In the end, nostalgia need not be what pushes us back into the past, but what 
pulls us into a more just future built upon the foundations of those dreamers 
whose hoped-for future may still be ours. That is a nostalgia worthy of defense. 
 
 
